Some advocates of far higher capital requirements for banks invoke the Modigliani-Miller theorem as grounds for judging that associated costs would be minimal. The M&M theorem holds that the average cost of capital to the firm is independent of capital structure, because any reduction in capital cost from switching to higher leverage using lowercost debt is exactly offset by an induced increase in the unit cost of higher-cost equity capital as a consequence of the associated rise in risk. Statistical tests for large US banks in 2002-13 find that less than half of this M&M offset attains in practice. Higher capital requirements would thus impose increases in lending costs, with associated output costs from lower capital formation. These costs to the economy would need to be compared with benefits from lower risk of banking crises to arrive at optimal levels of capital requirements.
IntroductIon
The financial crisis and Great Recession of 2008-09, like the banking crisis and Great Depression of the 1930s, have provoked regulatory reform in the financial sector. Internationally, the new "Basel III" rules approximately double minimum capital requirements for most banks and triple them (or more) for systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). 1 The new requirements also introduce a minimum "leverage ratio" capitalization of 3 percent of total (as opposed to risk-weighted) assets in the Basel rules and 4 percent in the United States (BCBS 2014; Federal Reserve 2013) . 2 A separate issue is whether to shift from risk-weighted assets to total assets as the base for applying capital requirements. Thomas
Hoenig (2013) argues that the metric of risk-weighted assets is illusory and should largely be replaced by total assets and the regulatory emphasis shifted to the capital leverage ratio.
Some economists have called for far higher capital requirements. Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig (2013) propose a leverage ratio requiring equity capital of 20 to 30 percent of total assets (p.179).
Considering that risk-weighted assets are typically only about half as large as total assets (Hoenig 2013), this target would correspond to a capital requirement of 40 to 60 percent of risk-weighted assets, about five times as high as the risk-weighted capital target for SIFIs in Basel III. The empirical tests in this study are motivated in considerable part by the apparent wide divergence in expert opinion about desirable capital requirements for banks.
A key theoretical element of arguments favoring far higher capital ratios is the "capital structure irrelevance" proposition of Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller (1958) . This "M&M" hypothesis maintains that there is no optimal relationship of equity finance to debt finance for a firm, because any increase in profitability through greater leverage will be offset by an increase in the unit cost of the remaining equity capital as a consequence of greater risk. On this premise, some argue that there should in principle be no reason for banks to oppose far higher equity capital requirements because the resulting reduction in their leverage would result in a fully compensating reduction in the cost of equity capital. 1. In the change from Basel II to Basel III, common equity is to rise from 2 percent of risk-weighted assets (RWA) to 4.5 percent. Total tier 1 capital (which includes common equity) is to rise from 4 percent of RWA to 6 percent. There is an additional "capital conservation buffer" of 2.5 percent, bringing the total to 8.5 percent (BCBS 2010a, 69). In addition, SIFIs are to maintain extra capital, set at 2.5 percent of RWA in the Basel rules and up to 4.5 percent in the United States (Yalman Onaran, Jesse Hamilton, and Ian Katz, "Big US Banks Face Capital Requirements of Up to 4.5% on Top of Global Minimum," Bloomberg, December 9, 2014).
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In contrast, the few analytical attempts at identifying optimal capital requirements from society's viewpoint tend to acknowledge that higher capital requirements will make banks less profitable, and reduce lending and economic activity somewhat as a consequence. In these studies such reductions are set against the corresponding reductions in probabilities of financial crises, and thus expected damages avoided, to arrive at the optimal increases in capital requirements. 4 The purpose of this paper is to examine the empirical evidence on the M&M proposition as applied to the banking sector. The central question is whether more highly capitalized banks do indeed enjoy lower costs of equity capital. The actual extent of such a relationship can then be used as an input into a broader analysis of optimal bank capital requirements from the standpoint of society, taking account of risks of financial crises from insufficient bank capitalization.
Is BAnkIng specIAl?
At the outset it is useful to address in qualitative terms the question, "Why is banking different?" For the nonfinancial sector, shareholder equity capital typically accounts for about one-third of total assets, whereas debt and other liabilities amount to about two-thirds (see, e.g., Rajan and Zingales 1995, 1428).
In contrast, in the postwar period US commercial banks have had equity-to-asset ratios (book value basis)
of only 4 to 6 percent up to the 1970s, rising to 6 percent in the late 1980s and 9 percent by 2007 (Berlin 2011, 5). Leverage on the order of 10 to 1 (or higher) instead of 3 to 1 has meant that the literature in this area has tended to treat the financial sector as "different," typically excluding it from empirical tests.
It seems intuitively appealing that the sector of financial intermediation should rely more heavily on debt financing than nonfinancial sectors. The intensity of inputs in a sector should depend on the nature of the output of the sector. One would not expect oil refining to have the same ratio of crude oil to total output as, say, the computer industry. Financial intermediation is a sector that by definition involves as its main input debt in the form of deposits by households and corporations. The main product provided by the bank is a store of value that has a high degree of safety and liquidity: bank checking and saving accounts. The sector also is based on acting as the intermediary that transforms short-term claims (deposits) into long-term claims (e.g., mortgages). Deposits are financial liabilities. Replacing them entirely with equity would require that the public be told that henceforth bank deposits are not available and instead households and corporations must hold liquid assets in the form of equity shares (e.g., in
4. Thus, Miles, Yang, and Marcheggiano (2012, 18) apply an M&M offset of only about one-half in their cost of capital calculations, based on UK bank data. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS 2010b, 23) makes no allowance at all for an M&M offset, although it does so apparently in the spirit of concluding that its calculation of optimal capital requirements may correspondingly be conservative, and it cites Kashyap, Stein, and Hanson (2010) as supporting the M&M relationship of equity cost to leverage.
4 mutual funds). 5 Considering that deposits amount to about one-half of assets for the large banks and much more for smaller banks, the deposit-taking nature of the banking sector inherently means that the ratio of "debt" (including "debt" to depositors) to assets will tend to be higher than in most sectors.
There is a considerable tradition in the literature that debt/equity characteristics of banking are likely to be different from those of other firms. Thus, in their analysis of equity returns Eugene Fama and Kenneth French (1992, 429) "exclude financial firms because the high leverage that is normal for these firms probably does not have the same meaning as for nonfinancial firms, where high leverage more likely indicates distress." In a recent survey, Mitchell Berlin (2011, 8) essentially adopts the proposition that financial intermediation is inherently levered when he states: "Since liquid liabilities are a primary output of the banking firm, we should expect banks to be highly levered." Similarly, Richard Herring (2011, 9) observes that "Since some liabilities are really a product supplied by the bank rather than simply a means of funding the bank, we know that a 100% equity-to-asset ratio cannot be the correct answer."
Although Miller (1995) himself informally discussed whether M&M applies to banking, his answer was an ambivalent "Yes and No." 6 One key reason that has been given for observed high leverage in banking is that deposits are subsidized by publicly provided deposit insurance (e.g., Admati and Hellwig 2013). However, it turns out that nonbank financial firms that do not enjoy deposit insurance also have high leverage. Thus, in
2001-07, the median ratio of total assets to shareholder funds was 19.1 for banks, and 12.1 for nonbank financial firms, but only 3.0 for nonfinancial sectors (Herring 2011, 17) . Once again the implication is that something is different about leverage for the financial sector even after removing the influence of deposit insurance.
Perhaps the most explicit analysis finding that banking is different is that by Harry DeAngelo and
René Stulz (2013, 1, 3), who conclude that "MM's leverage irrelevance theorem is simply inapplicable to banks. … given a material market demand for liquidity, intermediaries will emerge to meet that demand with high leverage capital structures (made possible by asset structures optimized to produce liquidity)."
In their model, with the bank choosing a portfolio of assets that is "not risky at the optimum" (p. 8),
debt as a share of debt plus equity turns out to be the ratio 1/[1+q +φz]. Here q is the "liquidity spread"
that those purchasing liquidity from banks accept for assured future access to capital, and φ is the "loan spread" paid on bank loans by those with limited access to capital markets. With reasonable values for q 5. As proposed by Kotlikoff (2010).
6. This was the three-word abstract of his article. In the article he also acknowledged that "taken literally, they [the M&M Propositions] would not apply anywhere else either. Much of the research focus in finance in the last 30 years has been precisely on those departures from the strict M&M assumptions-things like taxes and agency costs-that will give a push or a tilt towards more or less leverage.… No very simple or coherent set of tilting principles has yet emerged, however, nor, for that matter, has any clear pattern of capital structures been observed across firms" (p. 487).
and φ, this ratio will be high, relatively close to unity. Moreover, the contrast with lower bank leverage in earlier historical times can be explained by the bidding down of q over time as financial markets developed. Similarly to the analogy suggested above to oil refining, DeAngelo and Stulz (2013, 9) state that "Banks are different because financial flows are the inputs and outputs they utilize to generate value for their shareholders."
Charles Calomiris and Richard Herring (2011) also take issue with the notion that equity capital can be increased indefinitely without costs to the banks. They cite Anil Kashyap, Raghuram Rajan, and Jeremy Stein (2008) regarding the adverse influence of too much equity on agency problems, as reduced leverage could insulate bank managers from market discipline if leverage is low and stock ownership is more fragmented than borrowing. Calomiris and Herring believe that although an increase in capital is necessary, "… we recognize that there are negative, not just diminishing, social returns to achieving that higher amount of capital solely by raising equity capital requirements beyond some point" (p. 14). Their solution instead is to supplement the equity capital requirement with required contingent capital (CoCo) in the form of debt that would convert to common equity upon a trigger (based on 90-day average of bank stock prices). Their objective is to make the conversion so unattractive to the banks that managers would have an extreme incentive to issue more equity early in an emerging deterioration rather than wait too late. They propose a (book value) leverage ratio of 10 percent equity relative to assets, supplemented by required CoCo funding of 10 percent of book assets (Calomiris and Herring 2011, 29). Their equity capital requirement would thus be only one-third to one-half the level proposed by Admati and Hellwig (2013), although it would be about twice the Basel III level for SIFIs (9.5 percent of RWA, corresponding to about 5 percent of total assets).
cApM BetAs versus dIrect estIMAtIon
It is important to emphasize that unlike the few existing empirical estimates of the M&M effect for banks, the tests in this study do not use the indirect route of identifying the stock price "beta" for banks within the framework of the Sharpe-Lintner-Black capital asset pricing model (CAPM). In that framework, the riskiness of a given stock relative to a diversified equity portfolio is measured by the parameter beta, which tells the percent by which the stock price rises when the overall market rises by one percent, or falls when the overall market falls by one percent. Given the CAPM theory, the equity yield of a stock should equal the risk-free return plus the stock's "beta" multiplied by the excess of the diversified market yield over the risk-free rate (the "equity premium"). For example, if the beta is 1.5, the risk-free return is 4 percent, and the general diversified stock market premium is an additional 4 percent (placing average equity return at 8 percent), then the return on the stock in question would be expected to be 10 percent. 7 The leading 7. That is: 4 + 1.5 x (8 -4) = 10.
empirical studies of M&M for banks conduct statistical tests that calculate beta as a function of the bank leverage ratio (capital relative to assets). 8 Considering that the analytical objective for policy purposes is to calculate the extent to which a reduction in the unit cost of equity can be expected to offset the shift from low-cost debt to high-cost equity in the process of increasing regulatory capital requirements, in principle the CAPM framework can provide a means of accomplishing this objective.
However, it is much more direct to apply the estimation form implied by the original M&M article (as set forth in equation 1 below) than to infer the M&M influence through the bank beta in the CAPM framework. Such a test provides direct evidence on how much the equity yield can be expected to decline when the ratio of debt to equity is reduced. Because the CAPM has been found to provide poor explanation of equity prices with regard to the beta coefficient, it is problematical to rely on use of the beta as the indirect means to identify the M&M influence. 9 Fama and French (2004) find that the response of the equity return to changes in the stock's beta is only about one-third the size of what is predicted by the CAPM, such that stocks with low betas have higher than expected return and stocks with high betas have lower than expected returns. 10 On this basis, those who apply a bank beta estimated in relationship to leverage to calculate the reduction in required equity yields in response to higher capital should presumably shrink their raw estimates by two-thirds.
At a broader level, it is curious to accept the CAPM beta framework to estimate how much additional bank capital would reduce equity capital cost without recognizing that the banking sector already has an average beta of about unity. 11 If bank stocks are already about as safe as the equity market as a whole, what are the grounds for arguing that the sector is unduly risky and needs deeper capitalization in comparison with other sectors?
ArBItrAge versus optIMIzAtIon
A final introductory remark concerns the framework of M&M and its relationship to other frameworks of optimization. At its core, M&M is based on an arbitrage proposition. It is a logical syllogism that holds:
(a) any debt-equity configuration chosen by the firm can be "unwound" by investors, who can sell shares 9. Fama and French (1992) state that "Our bottom line results are: (a) β [beta] does not seem to help explain the cross-section of average stock returns, and (b) the combination of size and book-to-market equity seems to absorb the roles of leverage and E/P in average stock returns…." (p. 428).
10. The authors report that for 1928-2003, average monthly returns are what CAPM would predict for a beta of 1.25, but for a beta of 1.8 the predicted return is considerably higher (at 17 percent) than the actual observed (14 percent), whereas for a beta of 0.6 the predicted return (8 percent) is considerably lower than the actual observed (11 percent). The ratio of the actual difference between the two ends of the spectrum to the CAPM-predicted is thus [ of a highly leveraged firm and purchase shares in unleveraged firms using the proceeds plus borrowed funds, bidding down the share price of the leveraged firm and bidding up the share price of the unleveraged firm. (b) Market arbitrage will eliminate any profitability advantage of a more highly leveraged firm. (c) Therefore the capital structure (ratio of equity to debt) is irrelevant. The authors do not formally introduce risk. It is telling that their equations do not include an investor utility function, and they do not posit a typical degree of risk aversion. Nor do their equations set forth a probabilistic profile of returns in relationship to the debt-equity ratio, nor any hypothesized distribution function for returns. With such a function it would be possible to explore the optimal debt-equity ratio as a function of the risk aversion characterizing financial markets. Instead the authors appeal to "risk" only qualitatively and by implication maintain that any risk aversion whatsoever will suffice to drive their arbitrage process and rule out any superiority of one debt-equity ratio over any other.
specIfyIng the tests
As set forth in appendix A, the M&M proposition leads to a straightforward specification for an empirical test. The theorem yields the result that:
additional bank capital would reduce equity capital cost without recognizing that the banking sector already has an average beta of about unity.
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If bank stocks are already about as safe as the equity market as a whole, what are the grounds for arguing that the sector is unduly risky and needs deeper capitalization in comparison with other sectors?
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A final introductory remark concerns the framework of M&M and its relationship to other frameworks of optimization. At its core, M&M is based on an arbitrage proposition. It is a logical syllogism that holds: (a) any debt-equity configuration chosen by the firm can be "unwound" by investors, who can sell shares of a highly leveraged firm and purchase shares in unleveraged firms using the proceeds plus borrowed funds, bidding down the share price of the leveraged firm and bidding up the share price of the unleveraged firm. (b) Market arbitrage will eliminate any profitability advantage of a more highly leveraged firm. (c) Therefore the capital structure (ratio of equity to debt) is irrelevant. The authors do not formally introduce risk. It is telling that their equations do not include an investor utility function, and they do not posit a typical degree of risk aversion. Nor do their equations set forth a probabilistic profile of returns in relationship to the debt-equity ratio, nor any hypothesized distribution function for returns. With such a function it would be possible to explore the optimal debt-equity ratio as a function of the risk aversion characterizing financial markets. Instead the authors appeal to "risk" only qualitatively and by implication maintain that any risk aversion whatsoever will suffice to drive their arbitrage process and rule out any superiority of one debt-equity ratio over any other.
Specifying the Tests
9 Fama and French (1992) state that "Our bottom line results are: (a) β [beta] does not seem to help explain the cross-section of average stock returns, and (b) the combination of size and book-to-market equity seems to absorb the roles of leverage and E/P in average stock returns…." (p. 428). 10 The authors report that for 1928-2003, average monthly returns are what CAPM would predict for a beta of 1.25, but for a beta of 1.8 the predicted return is considerably higher (at 17 percent) than the actual observed (14 percent), whereas for a beta of 0.6 the predicted return (8 percent) is considerably lower than the actual observed (11 percent). The ratio of the actual difference between the two ends of the spectrum to the CAPM-predicted is thus where i is the cost of equity capital as measured by ratio of earnings per share to price per share (the earnings yield or inverse of the price/earnings ratio); ρ is the "capitalization rate" at which expected streams of future earnings are capitalized (discounted) for the "class" (by implication, sector) of the firms in question; r is the rate of interest at which both the firm and investors can borrow; D is the firm's debt, and S is shareholder equity in the firm. Subscript j refers to the firm observed. Because the capitalization rate exceeds the interest rate (ρ > r), reducing debt relative to equity will reduce the earnings yield demanded by the market, thanks to reduction in perceived risk. The formulation turns out to cause exactly the amount of reduction in the earnings yield that is needed to have the average cost of capital remain constant. Moreover, this average cost of capital must equal the capitalization rate ρ (appendix A,
The average cost of capital will be the weighted average of the cost of equity capital and the interest rate cost of debt. Defining V as the value of the firm, setting this value as being equal to debt plus equity (V = D + S), and defining the debt financing share y as the fraction of total value attributable to debt rather than equity (such that y = D/V), it follows that: 6 where i is the cost of equity capital as measured by ratio of earnings per share to price per share (the earnings yield or inverse of the price/earnings ratio); ρ is the "capitalization rate" at which expected streams of future earnings are capitalized (discounted) for the "class" (by implication, sector) of the firms in question; r is the rate of interest at which both the firm and investors can borrow; D is the firm's debt, and S is shareholder equity in the firm. Subscript j refers to the firm observed. Because the capitalization rate exceeds the interest rate (ρ > r), reducing debt relative to equity will reduce the earnings yield demanded by the market, thanks to reduction in perceived risk. The formulation turns out to cause exactly the amount of reduction in the earnings yield that is needed to have the average cost of capital remain constant. Moreover, this average cost of capital must equal the capitalization rate ρ (appendix A, equation A4).
The average cost of capital will be the weighted average of the cost of equity capital and the interest rate cost of debt. Defining V as the value of the firm, setting this value as being equal to debt plus equity (V = D + S), and defining the debt financing share y as the fraction of total value attributable to debt rather than equity (such that y = D/V), it follows that:
As demonstrated in appendix B, given equation (1), the derivative of ACC (average cost of capital) in equation (2) with respect to the ratio of debt to equity is zero. Capital structure (i.e., the decision to finance through debt as opposed to equity) therefore has no influence on the average cost of capital in the M&M framework.
For purposes of empirical implementation, equation (1) can be estimated as:
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where z is defined as the debt to equity ratio (z = D/S), a = ρ, and b = (ρ -r). To support the M&M hypothesis, the constant a should be found to have a value that plausibly represents the return to capital in the banking sector (ρ), and the coefficient b should be such that a -b yields a plausible value for the difference between this rate and the interest rate r.
Data
The database developed for the tests in this study is drawn from the annual filings of form 10-K with the Securities and Exchange Commission for the 54 largest US banks, for the period 2001-13.
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These banks range in size from assets of $2.4 trillion at the end of 2013 for JP Morgan Chase to $6.5 billion for PacWest Bancorp (Los Angeles, California). They accounted for total assets of $13.2 trillion at the end of 2013, representing 82.7 percent of total assets of US depository institutions (Federal Reserve 2014, 77).
The 10-K data report total assets, total liabilities, and shareholder equity (the difference). Total liabilities are used as the estimate of debt (D in equation 1), and shareholder equity as the estimate of equity (S). The dependent variable i, cost of equity capital, is estimated as the inverse of the price/ earnings ratio for the year in question, using the fourth-quarter average stock price and trailing 12-where z is defined as the debt to equity ratio (z = D/S), a = ρ, and b = (ρ -r). To support the M&M hypothesis, the constant a should be found to have a value that plausibly represents the return to capital in the banking sector (ρ), and the coefficient b should be such that a -b yields a plausible value for the difference between this rate and the interest rate r. The 10-K data report total assets, total liabilities, and shareholder equity (the difference). Total liabilities are used as the estimate of debt (D in equation 1), and shareholder equity as the estimate of equity (S). The dependent variable i, cost of equity capital, is estimated as the inverse of the price/ earnings ratio for the year in question, using the fourth-quarter average stock price and trailing 12-month earnings. 13 These data are also from the 10-K filings for most banks, or from Bloomberg otherwise.
It is a standard principle of corporate finance that the "earnings yield," or inverse of the price/ earnings ratio, should be higher when the riskiness of the asset is greater. 14 There should be no ambiguity whatsoever that the "expected" earnings yield should be higher for higher risk, other things being equal. discounted present value of its future stream of earnings. Expected future earnings depend on the base period earnings and the expected rate of growth of earnings in the future. The appropriate discount rate to apply equals the risk-free rate of return plus a premium to reflect the riskiness of the firm. In the M&M framework, this riskiness varies directly with the ratio of debt to equity. The discount rate will thus be higher for a more leveraged firm. Accordingly, for a specific class of firms (such as banks) in which the growth rate of future earnings is expected to be similar among the firms in question, the earnings yield is expected to be higher for firms with greater risk. Application of a higher risk premium in the discount rate will translate the future stream of earnings into a lower present value (stock price) relative to earnings.
Although stock valuation is based on expected future earnings, empirical estimates require the use of actual observed earnings as the proxy for expected future earnings. However, use of the observed earnings yield as the measure of the cost of equity capital raises the problem of interpreting data for a year of losses.
The problem is that in such years actual net earnings will not be a meaningful proxy for the expected points, as the lowest meaningful rate at which investors might be prepared to provide equity capital.
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Choice of the real rate reflects the fact that when inflation is expected the nominal stream of earnings will be expected to rise over time, automatically providing inflation protection, such that inclusion of the inflation rate for the year in question would be double-counting expected inflation.
As an alternative measure of the cost of equity capital, a second test uses the ratio of net income in the year in question to the book value of equity at the end of the previous year. The same imposed floor replaces observations for years with negative income. losses, but it turns out that the frequency of larger losses is relatively low. Of course, a major caveat is that the book income may be overstated (and losses understated) by failing to capture erosion in market value of assets in periods of stress. 18 Nonetheless, the distribution of income results in figure 2 suggests that setting the capital leverage ratio far higher than the US level would amount to addressing a small fraction of cases based on the most recent decade's experience.
test results
The tests here estimate equation (3) where ey is the earnings yield (percent), or inverse of the price/earnings ratio; z is the ratio of debt to equity (with equity defined as the excess of book assets over book liability); and D is a dummy variable with value 1 for 2008-10 and 0 otherwise. T-statistics are in parentheses.
The coefficient on the leverage ratio is not significant. Importantly, the size of the coefficient is relatively small, about 5 basis points for each unit change in the leverage ratio. Instead, the M&M value for the coefficient should be ρ -r. It seems unlikely that the interest rate r would be so close to the bank "class" rate of return on capital that the difference would be this small.
When the net income/equity variant is applied instead as the measure of the unit cost of equity capital, there is a considerably stronger relationship:
(10.0) (9.4) (-10.5)
where NI t /E t-1 is the ratio of book net income to equity at the end of the previous year (percent). This time the coefficient on the leverage ratio is highly significant. Moreover, its size is substantial, at about 60 basis points for each increment by unity in the ratio of debt to equity. Nonetheless, even this magnitude is small as a likely gauge of the excess of the banking sector return on capital minus the interest rate. Application of fixed-effects tests for an unbalanced panel yields results that are very close to those of equations (4) and (5). 21 Because of their simplicity and transparency, the results in equations (4) and (5) are applied in the impact estimates below. (4) and (5) to assess the effects of raising bank capital from a benchmark of 10 percent of total assets to 25 percent (the midpoint of the range suggested by Admati and Hellwig 2013). This increase is equivalent to reducing the debt/equity ratio from 9 to 3.
IMplIcAtIons for the AverAge cost of cApItAl
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The cost of equity capital is obtained using equation (4) or (5) (with no dummy variable) as applied first to z = 9 and next to z = 3. 23 The table considers two cases: one (A) with the interest rate at 3 percent and the other (B) at 2 percent.
The table then shows average cost of capital before the reform (0) and after (1), for each of the two alternative interest rate assumptions. The table also shows the corresponding changes in average cost of capital. Surprisingly, the two models show identical changes in the average cost of capital: an increase of 54 basis points if the real interest rate is 3 percent, and 69 basis points if the real interest rate is 2 percent. Essentially the larger coefficient b in the NI/E model and higher base level of equity cost provide a substantially larger absolute reduction in the cost of equity, but because the equity cost (both before and after) is substantially higher in the NI/E model than in the equity yield model, there is a fully offsetting effect from a more powerful impact of shifting from low-cost debt to high-cost equity.
The table next shows the change in average capital cost that would occur if there were no M&M effect at all (namely, the unit cost of equity capital after the reform is identical to that before the reform).
Finally, the table reports the corresponding percent of total potential increase in average cost of capital that is offset by the induced reduction in equity capital cost as a consequence of the M&M effect. As expected from the small size of coefficient b in the ey model and large size of this coefficient in the NI/E model, the percentage offset is much smaller in the earnings yield model (only about 10 percent) than in the net-income model (about 60 percent).
Taking the averages over the two models and two alternative interest rates, the expected change in the average cost of capital from the higher capital requirement would amount to 61.5 basis points. In the 21. Using fixed effects, which is equivalent to having individual dummy variables for each bank and each year, yields the following coefficients on the debt/equity ratio z t-1 : 0.063 requirements cause an increase in bank lending rates, the result is likely to be welfare-enhancing from the viewpoint of society as opposed to private shareholders and borrowers. Their reason is that existing government guarantees of deposit, as well as implicit guarantees of too-big-to-fail, give a distorted incentive to banks to take excessive risks that can damage the economy in a financial crisis. These distorted incentives are additive to the general distortion from tax favoritism to debt relative to equity.
Identifying socially optimal increases in bank capital, however, would require taking into account a realistic evaluation of costs to the economy from raising bank lending rates and as a consequence reducing capital formation. It may well be that the corresponding reduction in expected social losses from financial crises would warrant substantial costs from lower capital formation. But in principle there is likely to be some optimal limit to the socially beneficial increase in capital if the operational effect is some loss in output because the M&M offset is in fact far from complete. It is further worth noting that social benefits are associated with the service of providing bank deposits, because they constitute money performing 27. That is: 20/460 = 0.043. Note that Miles, Yang, and Marcheggiano (2012, 16) get a much smaller proportionate increase in the cost of capital: only 0.6 percent, for a halving of leverage. The much lower figure results from a lower estimate of the impact on bank lending rates (18 basis points instead of 62) and a substantially higher estimate of average equity cost (10 percent instead of 6.8 percent) and borrowing costs (5 percent instead of 3.5 percent). The lower impact in part reflects the fact that their halving of leverage is less aggressive than the two-thirds reduction in leverage (from 9:1 to 3:1) examined here and implied by the preferred range of Admati and Hellwig (2013). The lower estimates in Miles, Yang, and Marcheggiano (2012) translate to a present value loss equal to 6 percent of one year's GDP, much smaller than the 35 percent estimate here (despite their discounting over an infinite horizon rather than just 30 years).
28. That is: 0.25 × 4.3. It should be emphasized that the 1.08 percent reduction refers to the level of GDP at each future point in time, not to the annual average growth rate over the period. 
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Consider the significance of this reduction over a tangible time horizon such as 30 years. Assuming baseline GDP growth at 2 percent, and discounting by a social rate of time preference of 1.5 percent, the present discounted value of the loss of output over this horizon would amount to 35 percent of the base year's GDP.
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Further Considerations
Social versus Private Returns. Admati et al. (2011, (22) (23) argue that even if higher bank capital requirements cause an increase in bank lending rates, the result is likely to be welfare-enhancing from the viewpoint of society as opposed to private shareholders and borrowers. Their reason is that existing government guarantees of deposit, as well as implicit guarantees of too-big-to-fail, give a distorted incentive to banks to take excessive risks that can damage the economy in a financial crisis. These distorted incentives are additive to the general distortion from tax favoritism to debt relative to equity.
Identifying socially optimal increases in bank capital, however, would require taking into account a realistic evaluation of costs to the economy from raising bank lending rates and as a consequence reducing capital formation. It may well be that the corresponding reduction in expected social losses from financial crises would warrant substantial costs from lower capital formation. But in principle there is likely to be some optimal limit to the socially beneficial increase in capital if the operational effect is some loss in output because the M&M offset is in fact far from complete. It is further worth noting that social benefits are associated with the service of providing bank deposits, because they constitute money performing its three basic functions: liquidity, store of value, and medium of exchange. It is not clear that the social subsidy to banks from government deposit guarantee is greatly larger than the social externality provided by banks in the form of providing money in the form of deposits.
In short, although recognition of the need to take societal externalities into account could indeed lead to identification of optimal capital requirements that are significantly higher than in the past, the calibration of appropriate policy is considerably more complicated than implied by a general proposition that higher capital requirements are costless and existing capital arrangements subsidize banks and encourage them to take risks at the expense of the public.
Monetary Policy Offset?
Another central policy question is whether to be concerned at all about possible increases in bank lending rates as a consequence of higher capital requirements, on grounds that any such increase in interest rates could be offset by a relaxation in monetary policy. A major problem with this "monetary policy offset" argument is that monetary policy should be reserved for the task of achieving a balanced macroeconomic outcome regarding inflation and unemployment. It is 28 That is: 0.25  4.3. It should be emphasized that the 1.08 percent reduction refers to the level of GDP at each future point in time, not to the annual average growth rate over the period. 29 See Cline (1992, 255) for derivation of a long-term rate of social time preference of 1.5 percent. This parameter is based on an elasticity of marginal utility of -1.5, combined with a long-term growth rate of per capita income of 1 percent. (The social rate of time preference equals the rate of pure time preference, for myopia, plus the elasticity of marginal utility multiplied by the growth rate of per capita consumption; see Ramsey 1928. I have argued, following Ramsey, that there is no justification for pure time preference from the standpoint of society.)
Define g =0.02 as the baseline growth rate,  =0.015 as the social rate of time preference, and  =0. its three basic functions: liquidity, store of value, and medium of exchange. It is not clear that the social subsidy to banks from government deposit guarantee is greatly larger than the social externality provided by banks in the form of providing money in the form of deposits.
Another central policy question is whether to be concerned at all about possible increases in bank lending rates as a consequence of higher capital requirements, on grounds that any such increase in interest rates could be offset by a relaxation in monetary policy. A major problem with this "monetary policy offset" argument is that monetary policy should be reserved for the task of achieving a balanced macroeconomic outcome regarding inflation and unemployment. It is unlikely that any increase in private sector borrowing costs resulting from higher bank capital requirements could be exactly offset by precisely the same reduction in interest rates that would be optimal from the standpoint of addressing the induced changes in inflation and unemployment. This task would of course be even more difficult if the risk-free interest rate were already at the zero bound (as in 2008-15 in the United States following the Great Recession). Moreover, to the extent that over a period of years a higher bank lending rate had the consequence of reducing potential supply because of less capital formation, the central bank could have less scope for reducing interest rates without inflationary consequences because of more constrained supply.
conclusIon
Higher capital requirements may still be socially beneficial, but they are not free, and by implication it is desirable to compare social benefits of higher capital requirements against social costs associated with higher average capital cost and lower capital formation. If the rough calculations here are indicative, the implication would be that the sum of financial crisis losses avoided over the next 30 years as a consequence of a much higher capital requirement (benchmarked at an additional 15 percent of total assets) would need to be on the order of one-third of one-year's GDP to warrant the output costs of the additional bank capital. These costs would arise because, on the basis of statistical estimates for large US banks, less than half of the M&M offset (reduction in unit equity cost in response to reduction in leverage and thus risk) would be likely to occur. 
AppendIx A the ModIglIAnI-MIller Model
Modigliani and Miller (1958, 267-71) posit that for any given "class" of firms (implicitly, for example, a particular industrial sector), in the absence of any debt financing the price of a share of a given firm j will be the expected annual stream of income earned ("expected return") discounted by the expected rate of return for that class. Thus:
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where p j is the share price of firm j, �̅ � is the annual future steady stream of returns (earnings, abstracting from taxes) per share, and ρ is the characteristic rate of return to that class of firms. 
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They then introduce debt financing and examine its influence on share pricing. Their first proposition is that "the market value of any firm is independent of its capital structure and is given by capitalizing its expected return at the rate ρ k appropriate to its class" (p. 268). Thus:
16
where V j is the market value of the firm, S j is the market value of its common shares, � � � is expected return on assets owned by the company (before deduction of interest), and D j is the market value of the debt of the company.
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The authors define the "average cost of capital" as the ratio of expected return to the market value of all the firm's securities. Their proposition is then that this average cost is constant at the rate ρ applicable to the class in question, and consequently is "completely independent of the capital structure and is equal to the capitalization rate of a pure equity stream of its class" (p. 268). Thus:
where ACC is average cost of capital (my addition). This proposition challenged the then dominant view that average cost of capital was a declining function of leverage until leverage reached so high that the average cost rose once again because of rising risk, with the implication that there was some optimal leverage ratio.
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The conventional view apparently reflected the sense that debt capital was cheaper than equity capital so higher leverage would reduce the average cost of capital, whereas the central proposition of M&M was that higher leverage would introduce higher risk and increase the cost of equity capital enough to offset the rising share of debt capital.
To demonstrate this proposition, the authors invoke arbitrage between the share prices of two firms, one leveraged and the other not. Both firms have the same expected return (gross of interest), stated thus as simply X. The authors first suppose that the value of the levered firm, V 2 , is larger than that of the unlevered one, V 1 . They then consider an investor holding s 2 dollars' worth of shares in firm 2, constituting the fraction  of total shares in the firm worth S 2 . The return to this investor, Y 2 , will be the owned fraction of the firm times its income net of interest costs, or:
where D 2 is the amount of debt of firm 2, r is the interest rate, and   s 2 /S 2 .
The authors next have the investor sell his S 2 worth of shares in company 2 and purchase the larger amount s 1 =  (S 2 + D 2 ) of shares in company 1. In doing so, the investor borrows the amount D 2 where V j is the market value of the firm, S j is the market value of its common shares,
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The authors next have the investor sell his S 2 worth of shares in company 2 and purchase the where ACC is average cost of capital (my addition). This proposition challenged the then dominant view that average cost of capital was a declining function of leverage until leverage reached so high that the average cost rose once again because of rising risk, with the implication that there was some optimal 30. For convenience and because this study refers to a single sector, banking, I omit the subscript "k" that M&M include for the "class." Note further that M&M are not explicit about the role of inflation, but by implication their setup refers either to real values or to nominal values under the assumption of a constant rate of inflation.
31. D would thus include preferred shares. M&M do not address a situation in which default risk has sharply depressed the market value of a firm's debt below nominal value, considering that their construct treats D at face value (hence it can be applied directly to arrive at interest costs).
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leverage ratio. 32 The conventional view apparently reflected the sense that debt capital was cheaper than equity capital so higher leverage would reduce the average cost of capital, whereas the central proposition of M&M was that higher leverage would introduce higher risk and increase the cost of equity capital enough to offset the rising share of debt capital.
To demonstrate this proposition, the authors invoke arbitrage between the share prices of two firms, one leveraged and the other not. Both firms have the same expected return (gross of interest), stated thus as simply X. The authors first suppose that the value of the levered firm, V 2 , is larger than that of the unlevered one, V 1 . They then consider an investor holding s 2 dollars' worth of shares in firm 2, constituting the fraction α of total shares in the firm worth S 2 . The return to this investor, Y 2 , will be the owned fraction of the firm times its income net of interest costs, or:
value of all the firm's securities. Their proposition is then that this average cost is constant at the rate ρ applicable to the class in question, and consequently is "completely independent of the capital structure and is equal to the capitalization rate of a pure equity stream of its class" (p. 268). Thus:
32
The authors next have the investor sell his S 2 worth of shares in company 2 and purchase the larger amount s 1 =  (S 2 + D 2 ) of shares in company 1. In doing so, the investor borrows the amount D 2 to supplement the proceeds of the sale of company 2 shares. Keeping in mind that in firm 1 there is no debt so the value of the firm is solely total equity share value S 1 , the investor's income from the new holding in company 1 net of interest paid on the amount borrowed is then:
D would thus include preferred shares. M&M do not address a situation in which default risk has sharply depressed the market value of a firm's debt below nominal value, considering that their construct treats D at face value (hence it can be applied directly to arrive at interest costs). 32 M&M attributed this view for example to Graham and Dodd (1951) .
where D 2 is the amount of debt of firm 2, r is the interest rate, and α ≡ s 2 /S 2 .
The authors next have the investor sell his αS 2 worth of shares in company 2 and purchase the larger amount s 1 = α (S 2 + D 2 ) of shares in company 1. In doing so, the investor borrows the amount αD 2 to supplement the proceeds of the sale of company 2 shares. Keeping in mind that in firm 1 there is no debt so the value of the firm is solely total equity share value S 1 , the investor's income from the new holding in company 1 net of interest paid on the amount borrowed is then:
D would thus include preferred shares. M&M do not address a situation in which default risk has sharply depressed the market value of a firm's debt below nominal value, considering that their construct treats D at face value (hence it can be applied directly to arrive at interest costs). 32 M&M attributed this view for example to Graham and Dodd (1951) . Of course, this conclusion requires that the outside investors can borrow at the same interest rate as that paid by company 2 on its debt, "r". It is not clear in general that this would be the case; certainly retail investors seem likely to pay higher interest on stock margin debt than the typical borrowing cost of a sound firm. For banking, it is even more unlikely that outside investors can borrow at the same rate, because one-half or more of the funding of the bank is likely to come from deposits that bear extremely 32. M&M attributed this view for example to Graham and Dodd (1951) . low interest rates (if any). One can thus begin to see limitations on application of the model, especially for banks.
So long as
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Modigliani and Miller then show that conversely, if the unlevered firm were more valuable than the levered firm, the investor in the unlevered firm could sell stock, use the proceeds to buy shares in the levered firm and invest what is left over in bonds, until the value of the levered firm were bid up to that of the unlevered firm. This process would amount to "an operation which 'undoes' the leverage" (p. 270).
However, the general presumption had been that if there were any difference, levered firms would be more valuable, so the algebra going in the opposite direction need not detain this appendix.
The authors then turn to the result that is key for the empirical test here: The earnings yield of the stock in question should equal the capitalization rate appropriate to the class of the firm plus a constant times the ratio of debt to equity. The constant in question is the excess of the capitalization rate over the interest rate. This result is derived as follows. The earnings yield on a share of the stock will be: 34 company 1 shares and bid down the price of company 2 shares until V 2 = V 1 . The authors conclude "levered companies cannot command a premium over unlevered companies because investors have the opportunity of putting the equivalent leverage into their portfolio directly by borrowing on personal account" (p. 270).
Of course, this conclusion requires that the outside investors can borrow at the same interest rate as that paid by company 2 on its debt, "r". It is not clear in general that this would be the case; certainly retail investors seem likely to pay higher interest on stock margin debt than the typical borrowing cost of a sound firm. For banking, it is even more unlikely that outside investors can borrow at the same rate, because one-half or more of the funding of the bank is likely to come from deposits that bear extremely low interest rates (if any). One can thus begin to see limitations on application of the model, especially for banks.
Modigliani and Miller then show that conversely, if the unlevered firm were more valuable than the levered firm, the investor in the unlevered firm could sell stock, use the proceeds to buy shares in the levered firm and invest what is left over in bonds, until the value of the levered firm were bid up to that of the unlevered firm. This process would amount to "an operation which 'undoes' the leverage" (p. 270). However, the general presumption had been that if there were any difference, levered firms would be more valuable, so the algebra going in the opposite direction need not detain this appendix.
The authors then turn to the result that is key for the empirical test here: The earnings yield of the stock in question should equal the capitalization rate appropriate to the class of the firm plus a constant times the ratio of debt to equity. The constant in question is the excess of the capitalization rate over the interest rate. This result is derived as follows. The earnings yield on a share of the stock will be: 34 That is, total net earnings are the gross return less interest paid. But gross earnings are simply the constant capitalization rate for the class, ρ, times value of the firm (S+D). Simplifying: 35 The earnings yield should thus be a linear function of the ratio of debt to equity, with a constant intercept equal to the capitalization rate for the class, and a coefficient on the debt/equity ratio equal to the excess of the capitalization rate over the borrowing rate. To illustrate, M&M set = 1000, D = 4000, S = 6000, ρ = 10 percent, and r = 5 percent. Expected yield or rate of return per share is then 13.3 percent.
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In their example, if the capital structure reverses from 60 percent equity to 40 percent equity, 33 In particular (but not discussed by M&M), if the investor can borrow only at the higher rate r', then the interest rate applicable to equation (A6) becomes r', and (setting equation A5 equal to A6) arbitrage will stop when V 2 /V 1 = 1 + (r' -r)(D 2 /X). 34 Equation (9) in Modigliani and Miller (1958) . 35 That is: dividing each part of the numerator of the final right-hand-side of equation (A7) by S, and rearranging. Equation (8) in Modigliani and Miller (1958) . 36 That is: 0.1 + (0.1-0.05)(4000/6000) = 0.133.
That is, total net earnings are the gross return less interest paid. But gross earnings are simply the constant capitalization rate for the class, ρ, times value of the firm (S+D). Simplifying:
35
"levered companies cannot command a premium over unlevered companies because investors have the opportunity of putting the equivalent leverage into their portfolio directly by borrowing on personal account" (p. 270).
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In the case of US banks, with equity capital at about 10 percent of total assets and thus the debt-equity ratio at about 9, these same postulated rates would place the earnings yield implausibly high at 55 percent (and the price/earnings ratio implausibly low at 1.8 In its equation for the "return on equity," the study calculates the "shadow" cost of equity as equal to the target return on equity plus a coefficient of 0.5 multiplied by the excess in the growth of core tier 1 equity over the growth rate of nominal GDP. It does allow an M&M offset of 0.25 times the excess of the core tier 1 capital ratio over 7 percent. 50 It is this formulation that generates an increase in lending rates by 364 basis points over 5 years.
The overall thrust of the study is that rising equity costs associated with dilution effects in the face of relatively rapid phase-in of higher capital requirements would far outweigh M&M effects, such that the average cost of capital would rise not only from an increase in the fraction of financing coming from equity but also because of an increase in the cost of equity capital itself. However, the report does not provide specifics on these funding shares or the pre-and post-reform levels of equity capital costs. The report does state that "everyone accepts that most of the costs will be borne in the near term, whereas the benefits will be longer term in accruing" (IIF 2011, 11) . If this view is combined with the apparent outcome that effects in the near term have not been as severe as anticipated by the IIF, the broad implication would seem to be that the tradeoff will not have been as adverse as the IIF feared in 2011.
In contrast, the analysis of the present study focuses on persistent rather than short-term costs of higher equity requirements. Moreover, the estimates in the main text concern much larger capital increases than those agreed in Basel III.
Miles, Yang, and Marcheggiano (2012) conduct tests for 7 UK banks for the period 1997-2010 to estimate the influence of leverage on equity cost of capital. They apply the CAPM framework and thus focus on estimating market betas rather than directly investigating the relationship of equity yield to leverage. In their main finding, the equity beta equals a constant 1.07 plus the estimated coefficient 0.03
49. As noted in the main text, Cohen and Scatigna (2014) found that for 94 large banks internationally, actual experience in 2009 to 2012 showed an increase of 30 basis points in lending rates in association with an increase of 2.5 percentage points in capital relative to risk-weighted assets.
50. In addition, the equation includes the coefficient 0.5 times the excess of target return on equity minus realized return on equity.
times the ratio of assets to capital (pp. 10, 13). With an average asset to capital ratio of 30, by implication the average beta was approximately 2. 51 They translate the implications for equity cost of higher capital requirements as follows. They place average return on equity at approximately 15 percent, average bank borrowing cost at 5 percent, and average leverage at 30, implying weighted average cost of capital (WACC) of 5.33 percent. 52 They then consider the impact of doubling required capital, or lowering the leverage ratio from 30 to 15. In the absence of any M&M offset the effect would be to boost WACC to 5.66 percent, an increase of 33 basis points.
53
The authors then calculate the impact of higher capital requirements taking account of their estimated M&M offset. In the CAPM, the equity cost of a firm equals the risk-free rate plus the firm's beta multiplied by the market average risk premium. They place the risk-free rate at 5 percent, and the general market risk premium at 5 percent. With their regression estimate, the cost of equity capital at the lower leverage ratio (15 instead of 30) would fall to 12.6 percent. 54 As a consequence, the new WACC would be 5.51 percent. 55 The rise in the WACC would be 18 basis points instead of 33, indicating that the M&M effect would offset 45 percent of the potential rise in average cost of capital.
As it turns out, the central estimate in this study is also that the M&M offset would be 45 percent of the potential rise in the average cost of capital for bank lending. That estimate involves a more ambitious increase in capital (reducing the asset to capital ratio from 10 to 4, rather than from 30 to 15).
Finally, the authors acknowledge that the alternative of directly testing the relationship of required return on bank equity to bank leverage "has the advantage of not assuming the CAPM holds"(p. 14).
Unlike the present study, they find that in a regression of realized earnings relative to price (the equity yield) on leverage, "the impact on the required return on equity of changing leverage is about as big as if MM held exactly"(p. 15). Unfortunately, they do not report these results.
56
Yang and Tsatsaronis (2012) use a CAPM framework incorporating leverage as a shift variable affecting estimated betas. They find a statistically significant influence of leverage on the cost of equity capital.
However, this influence turns out to be relatively small. The estimates indicate that "if the ratio of a bank's total assets to its equity increases by 10 and the market return is 4% in excess of the risk-free rate, 56. Note also that testing earnings yield as a function of the asset/capital ratio would be a misspecification of M&M, which instead has the earnings yield as a linear function of the debt/equity ratio. At high leverage ratios the difference is not great but at intermediate and low ratios more characteristic of nonbank corporations the difference becomes large.
AppendIx d trends In unconstrAIned eArnIngs IndIcAtors of the cost of equIty cApItAl
The tests in the main text constrain observations on equity yield and net income relative to equity to be positive. For cases where earnings are negative, these two proxies for cost of equity capital are constrained to be greater than zero and are set equal to the real 5-year Treasury bond rate plus a moderate spread, as discussed in the main text. Figure D .1 shows the paths of the averages for the 54 banks using the unconstrained data, whereas figure 1 in the main text shows the constrained data. Confidence intervals (5 percent level) for each year are shown as well. percent NI/Eq % EY %
